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A b s h c t -  
We conduct a flow based comparison of honeynet traffic, 
representing malicious traffic, and NETIOhome traWc, rep- 
resenting typical end user traffic. We present a cumulative 
distribution function of the number of packets for a TCP 
flow and learn that a large portion of these Aows in both 
datasets are failed and potentially malicious connection at- 
tempts. Next, we look at a histogram of TCP port activity 
over large time scales to gain insight into port scanning and 
worm activity. One key observation is that new worms can 
linger on for more than a year after the initial release date. 
Finally, we look at activity relative to the IP address space 
and observe that the sources of malicious traffic are spread 
across the allocated range. 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has grown from the small ARPANET to  an 
unfathomably large network. As with any new technology, 
the Internet has grown from its infancy to a stage where 
security concerns become a considerable problem. Today’s 
Internet is plagued with a plethora of worms, viruses, mal- 
ware, spam, and otherwise malicious traffic. In this pa- 
per, we make observations about end user Internet activity 
by comparing honeynet traffic and NETI@home traffic in 
order to better understand the security problems of the 
Internet. 
Our strategy for understanding the malicious Internet 
traffic is a flow based analysis of several years of honeynet 
data and NETIQhome data. We study a number of metrics 
visually over large timescales and plot both the honeynet 
dataset and the NETIQhome dataset and then compare 
the results. Some interesting points include flow activity 
across the IP address space, port scan activity, new and 
lingering worm traffic, as well as other observations. Below 
we provide some background information on the datasets 
used. 
A .  NETI@home 
The NETI@home project was started to collect end user 
statistics from hosts on the Internet. These measurements 
are gathered using an open-source software package that 
end users can download from the NETIQhome website [l]. 
The software package has been designed to run on a num- 
ber of platforms in order to reach as many different users 
as possible. To collect data,  Internet users must volunteer 
to run the software package on their end hosts. Once the 
package is installed, the NETIQhome client will collect net- 
work statistics from the end host and periodically send a 
report back to the NETJQhome server. 
The NETIQhome project collects statistics on the TCP, 
UDP, ICMP, and IGMP protocols. Users can select a pri- 
vacy level of high, medium, or low, which determines what 
portions, if any, of the IP addresses are recorded in each 
flow. Some of the analysis presented in this paper requires 
using only low or medium privacy statistics and may skew 
the results slightly, but we feel that  our user base is large 
enough that such skewing is minimal. 
The NETIQhome dataset we are analyzing was collected 
from June 1, 2004 to February 28, 2005 and consists of re- 
ports from a t  least 500 uniquely identifiable users. There 
are approximately 31 million TCP flows and 33 million 
UDP flows in this dataset, constituting 65 gigabytes of 
transferred network traffic. The remaining flows consist of 
600 thousand ICMP flows and 250 thousand IGMP Aows. 
3. Georgia Tech Honeynet 
A honeynet is a network of resources whose value lies 
in the illicit use of those resources. All network traffic to 
and from a honeynet is suspicious, but a small amount of 
traffic may be legitimate. However, most of the traffic on 
a honeynet is malicious in nature. 
The Georgia Tech Honeynet Project was launched in the 
summer of 2002 and immediately began collecting da ta  [Z]. 
The dataset we are using consists of nearly three years of 
honeynet traffic with very few service interruption points 
for maintenance and upgrades. All network traffic to and 
from the honeynet has been logged and archived, including 
the traffic between the honeypots. 
To better understand the conclusions we draw from this 
data, it is important to understand the network on which 
this honeynet has been deployed. There are over 15,000 
students enrolled at Georgia Tech and approximately 5,000 
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staff and faculty employed. The supporting network con- 
sists of more than 40,000 networked systems all within 
Georgia Tech’s “.edu” address space. The honeynet has 
been deployed within this ‘‘.edu,’ address space and is ac- 
cessible from internal machines within the Georgia Tech 
address range as well as external machines. 
The honeynet dataset we are analyzing was collected 
from August 19, 2002 to February 28, 2005 and consists 
of reports from 38 unique IP addresses. There are approx- 
imately 2 million TCP flows and 350 thousand UDP flows 
constituting 7 gigabytes of transferred network traffic. The 
remaining flows consist of 40 thousand ICMP flows and no 
IGMP flows. During this time period there have been on 
the order of ten compromises. 
C. Observing Malicious %fit 
In this paper, we visually compare the network flows of 
a honeynet against the network flows in the NETI@home 
data. In particular, we make observations to try and an- 
swer these three questions: 
What are some of the characteristics of the malicious 
traffic observed on the Internet? 
How much malicious traffic is seen by end users on the 
Inter net? 
Are there identifiable sources of malicious traffic on the 
Internet? 
The remainder of the paper is organizcd as follows. First, 
we will describe some background information on our meth- 
ods for analyzing the data. Next, we present our findings 
and compare and contrast the results from the honeynet 
dataset and the NETIQhome dataset. Finally, we discuss 
some related work and present our conclusions and areas 
of future work. 
11. NETWORK FLOW ANALYSS 
In order to compare the NETI@home dataset with the 
honeynet dataset, we ran a customized version of the 
NETIOhome client on our honeynet data. This yielded 
flow based statistics of the honeynet data that is in the 
same format as the NETIQhome statistics and is suitable 
for comparison. In this section, we describe some of the 
statistics that are provided by the NETIQhome client. 
The NETI@home client collects statistics for four com- 
mon transport layer protocols: TCP, UDP, ICMP, and 
IGMP. Much of our analysis focuses on TCP Bows since 
they make up the majority of the traffic seen in our 
datasets. However, some data from UDP, ICMP, and 
IGMP are also presented in our results. 
The analysis technique is centered around the concept of 
a bidirectional flow, based on the commonly used 5-tuple, 
which consists of the source and destination IP addrcsses, 
source and destination ports, and the transport layer proto- 
col* Statistics gathered for each TCP flow include various 
time measurements, the number of packets sent and re- 
ceived, the source and destination parameters, failure flags, 
window size measurements, and various other information. 
Similar statistics are gathered for the flows that are of the 
other types of transport layer protocols. A full discussion 
of the statistics gathered can be found in [3]. 
Each Bow has a local IP and port number and a remote 
IF‘ and port number. Local refers to the host on which 
the client is running and collecting statistics from. Re- 
mote refers to the other host in the flow. Therefore, if a 
NETI@home user with IP 2 makes a web request to a given 
IP y, then 5 would be the local IP and y would be the re- 
mote IP. To further clarify, if  the same NETIOhome user 
was scanned by IP z ,  then x would still be the local IF and 
z would be the remote IP. 
There are several sources of bias in our datasets that 
may skew our results and are worth mentioning. First, an 
insignificant number of NETIQhome users had their clocks 
misconfigured so we did not include them in the results. 
Clock synchronization in general is a source of bias. Sec- 
ond, we did not include all IP results from NETIQhome 
users when their privacy was set to high because their IP 
addresses are unknown. Third, the honeynet dataset is 
known to be complete; however, the NETlOhorne dataset 
relies on the end users to run the NETIBhome client to 
monitor their systems and so may have some incomplete 
results. Fourth, the NETIQhome users must volunteer to 
run the client, so the data are not a truly random sample 
of Internet end users. Finally, the honeypots are all on 
the same network, whereas NETIQhome users are spread 
throughout the Internet. 
After collecting the flow statistics for both datasets, we 
created a framework to analyze the data. This framework 
allowed us to plot various graphs for both datasets for com- 
parison. Below, we present these graphs and discuss our 
observations. 
111. DATA OBSERVATIONS 
In order to aid in understanding what makes up the ma- 
jority of the malicious traffic on the Internet we have plot- 
ted various metrics for both the honeynet dataset and the 
NETIQhome dataset. The NETIQhome dat,aset represents 
a mixture of both legitimate/good traffic as wet1 as mali- 
cious traffic. The honeynet dataset represents almost en- 
t,irely malicious traffic. Comparing and contrasting these 
results can initiate a better understanding of the maIicious 
traffic seen on the Internet. 
A.  Number of Packets Per Flow 
In our first figure we graphed the cumulative distribu- 
tion function (CDF) of the number of packets for all TCP 
flows for each dataset. The results are shown in Figure 1 .  
First observe the honeynet curve. One can see two distinct 
inffection points for packet counts equal to one and two. 
TCP flows which consist of just one packet most likely con- 
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Fig. 1. Cumulative distribution 
U. 0 U
function of the number of packets per TCP flow 
tain one SYN packet. It is possible to have a single packet 
flow that is not a SYN packet. For instance, a RST or 
SYN/ACK packet could be received from a host that re- 
ceived a spoofed connection attempt. We did not observe 
many Bows of this nature. 
TCP flows which consist of two packets most likely con- 
sist of one SYN and one RST packet or one SYN and 
one SYN/ACK packet with no final ACK to complete the 
three-way handshake. Again, there are other combinations 
of TCP flows consisting of just two packets, but we have 
not observed many of these combinations. Any TCP flow 
consisting of two or less packets is a failed connection. On 
a honeynet, we consider these failed connections to be ma- 
licious probes. Therefore, on our honeynet dataset about 
87% of all TCP flows can be considered to be probes. 
We can contrast the NETIQhome CDF with the hon- 
eynet CDF and see that about 73% of all TCP flows can be 
considered failed connections. In the NETIQhome dataset, 
not ail of these failed connections are necessarily malicious 
probe packets as they may be legitimately failed connec- 
tions. However, it is interesting to note that in terms of 
number of packets per fiow the majority of observed TCP 
flows for end users are either probes or failed connections. 
B. TCP Port Histogram 
To better understand what ports and services malicious 
flows are targeting, we have generated a TCP Port His- 
togram over time for both the honeynet dataset as seen in 
Figure 2 and the NETIQhome dataset as seen in Figure 3. 
Each row of points represents one day. The width of the 
rows span the local TCP ports from 0 to 1024, which are 
Ihe well known ports [4]. The following formula was used 
to create the graphs, where i is the intensity value for a 
given point in a given row: 
0 i f c = O  
0.75 (&) + 0.25 otherwise (1) i =  { 0.45 
The maximum number of packets destined to a certain 
port on one day (i.e. one row in the figure) is denoted emu. 
A port with a packet count c is then visualized with inten- 
sity i according to above formula. If c is zero, the intensity 
is also set to zero (black). Otherwise, the intensity is chc- 
sen to be a value between 25% gray (i = 0.25) to white 
(i = 1.0, for the port where c = c,). The exponent is 
used to boost dark pixels to make them more visible, We 
choose to represent no activity with dark regions because 
it provides better contrast for the faint areas of activity. 
There are a number of observations to be made from 
these graphs. Two important characteristics of the figures 
to observe are the horizontal lines and the vertical lines. 
First, the horizontal lines represent port scans. Port scans 
are often malicious in nature as an attacker will generally 
use a port scan against a target in order to determine that 
target's weaknesses. In the honeynet data, a number of 
port scans can be seen over time, but the NETIQhome 
dataset shows a significantly denser number of port scans 
seen over time. This appears to be intuitive as there are 
an order of magnitude more NETIQhome users, which 
are distributed across the Internet both topologically and 
geographically, than there are honeypots in our dataset. 
Some factors that would decrease the number of port scans 
seen by NETIQhome end users include firewalls, NATs, or 
other similar configurations. Even with these factors, some 
NETI@home users are seeing similar port scans as seen on 
our hone ynet, 
Another interesting observation is that there are a num- 
ber of different types of scans seen. A t  least four diffefferent 
port scans are easily distinguished visually in the honeynet 
data as denoted by the letters A - D ,  and similar scans are 
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Fig. 2. Honeynet TCP Port Histogram 
observed in the NETIQhome data. The most naive port 
scan will scan all ports (B) .  The more sophisticated port 
scans will skip ports that are of little interest ( A ,  C, and 
D). There are a number of widely available port scanning 
tools, which offer various options for the scanning a l g s  
rithm [5 ,6] .  
One interesting difference seen in the horizontal Iines in 
the NETIQhome dataset are the stair step lines from a p  
proximately port 512 through 1024. Since the user that 
reported these flows was within the Georgia Tech network 
and used a low privacy level, we were able to determine 
what caused the stair step lines. An administrative ma- 
chine within the Georgia Tech network was scanning ports 
512 through 1024 over the course of several days. The algo- 
rithm consists of dividing the ports into a number of ranges 
and scanning one range each day. The source of the scan- 
ning was a machine used to help secure the network and so 
was altruistic. Therefore, we do not; consider these scam 
to be malicious in nature. 
The second interesting aspect to observe in these graphs 
are the vertical lines. The vertical lines represent ports that 
have continual traffic over large time scales. Looking at 
the honeynet graph from left to right, the most prominent 
TCP ports with continual traffic are 22 (ssh), 80 (www), 
135 (Microsoft Windows Service), 139 (Microsoft Windows 
Service), and 445 (Microsoft Windows Service). Most of 
these ports have been a target of one or more worms in the 
past in addition to legitimate traffic. 
There are a number of other vertical lines that are not as 
prominent in the honeynet dataset as seen in Figure 2. The 
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Fig. 3. NETIOhome TCP Port Histogram 
vertical line denoted by ‘1’ is LDAP traffic and was only 
seen for a short period of time. The line denoted by ‘2’ 
represents traffic seen from the real time service protocol 
worm. The traffic at ‘2’ is particularly interesting in the 
honeynet dataset. One can notice a bright burst of traf- 
fic starting on the worm release date that continues with 
intensity over the course of the next several days. After a 
number of days, the worm traffic slowly fades out as the 
infected machines are repaired. However, trailing effects of 
the worm can be seen from the point of release until the 
end of the dataset, which is over the course of more than 
a year. Therefore, we see lingering worm traffic exists on 
the Internet for long periods of time after the initial release 
date. 
The line denoted by ‘3’ represents traffic seen from the 
blaster worm as seen in Figure 2. This line also continues 
on for a long period of time, although its characteristics 
are not as distinguishable as the real time service proto- 
col worm. In  the honeynet data, it is not clear why traffic 
is seen at  the line denoted by ‘4’ a t  port 901. This may 
be traffic targeting an old Trojan port, REalSecure’s man- 
agement port, or Samba/SWAT on RedHat Linux based 
boxes. I t  is interesting to note that these trends seen’ in 
the honeynet data are repeated in the NETIQhome data 
in addition to the legitimate traflic a5 seen in Figure 3. 
Although, it is difficult to distinguish between legitimate 
traffic and worm traffic in the NETI@home dataset. 
C. IP Address Space 
The graphs in Figure 4 show where the traffic is coming 
from or going to within the entire IP address space. The IP 
address is divided into 256 buckets based on the first byte 
of the IP address. Figure 4(a) shows the honeynet graph. 
It is clear that certain portions of the address space have 
seen zero activity on the honeynet. These portions cor- 
respond with unallocated addresses as listed in the whois 
database. Given that there are no flows from most of these 
spaces to the honeynet, we conclude that there are not 
many spoofed IP packets coming from unallocated IPS to 
our honeynet. Further, either the number of packets with 
spoofed IP addresses coming to our honeynet is low or they 
are intelligently designed. 
The NETIQhome dataset has an additional baseline of 
traffic seen across most of the address range as seen in Fig- 
ure 4(b). Further investigation found that this baseline is 
caused by one or more NETI@home users sending out a 
large number of T C P  flows to TCP port 445 over a short 
period of time. We are unsure how many users were re- 
porting these results due to privacy settings. Figure 4(d) 
shows the number of flows to TCP port 445 versus the IP 
address space. There is clearly a horizontal line across the 
majority of the IP address space, which suggests that the 
NETIQhome user or users were randomly scanning the IP 
address space on T C P  port 445. The nature of this scan- 
ning may have be malicious in nature. For example, the 
user may have been infected with a worm as there have 
been worms that target TCP port 445. However, we can- 
not conclude for certain that the traffic was malicious in 
nature. 
In Figure 4(d), there is a small increase in traffic a t  
bucket number 10. This is probably due to local 445 traf- 
fic on private 10.0.0.0/8 networks. Similarly, there is an 
increase in traffic a t  bucket number 192. This increase 
would be due to local 445 traffic on private 192.168.0.0/16 
networks. The sharp drop in traffic a t  bucket number 127 
is due to the fact that the 127.0.0.0/8 network is the dedi- 
cated localhost network. Finally, the upper ranges of the IP 
address space did not see any scans. These ranges contain 
multicast, experimental, and other types of allocations. 
To better compare the NETIQhome data with the hon- 
eynet data, we graphed the NETIQhome dataset filtering 
out traffic to TCP port 445 as seen in Figure 4(c). Com- 
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paring Figures 4(a) and 4(c), one can notice a striking sim- 
ilarity between the NETI@home data and the honeynet 
data. Some differences in the NETIQhome data include 
traffic to the multicast range and some traffic in the un- 
allocated ranges. However, visually the two graphs have 
notably similar shapes. 
Based on our observations of the IP  traffic seen relative 
to IF address space, we note a possible algorithm for detect- 
ing suspicious machines. In previous work, we showed that 
a honeynet can be used to  find compromised machines on 
large enterprise networks by marking any machine on the 
enterprise that attempts to  connect to  the honeynet as sus- 
picious (71. An extension that we draw from these graphs 
is that  any machine attempting to connect to an unallo- 
cated IF‘ address should be considered suspicious and may 
be compromised. 
A graph of the remote IP versus local port for both 
datasets can be seen in Figure 5. Again, we only plot the 
well known TCP ports. In these graphs, one can see that 
remote IPS that appear in the flows are spread across the 
allocated IP spectrum, and again there is little traffic in the 
unallocated ranges, even in the NETIQhome data. Based 
on these graphs, wc observe that scans come from across 
the entire allocated IP address space. 
IV. RELATED WORK 
Much work has been accomplished on measuring Inter- 
net statistics. The Cooperative Association for Internet 
Data Analysis (CAIDA) was founded in order to provide 
“tools and analyses promoting the engineering and mainte- 
nance of a robust, scalable global Internet infrastructure.” 
IS]. CAIDA examines all aspects of the Internet including 
topology, routing, performance, and security. Much of the 
CAIDA measurements and results focus on macro-Internet 
observations while we present micro-Internet observations 
as seen by end hosts. 
There has also been much research on Internet worms. 
Work has been accomphshed on characterizing and looking 
at the trends of various worms [9,10]. Further, a detailed 
study of the spread time, algorithms, and damage caused 
by recent worms has been conducted. For example, Shan- 
non et. al. give an in depth look at  the Witty worm in [Ill,  
and Moore et. al. give an  in depth look at the Slammer 
worm in [123. We see both of these worms in our dataset 
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and data shows that their lingering effects are still active. 
Various schemes for measuring Internet activity have 
been designed and implemented. CAIDA uses a network 
telescope, which consists of a full / 8  network in order to 
observe worms, DOS attacks, network scanning, and other 
malicious activity [13]. SANS recently started the Internet 
Storm Center (ISC) in order to provide users and organi- 
zations with warnings against possible new threats seen on 
the Internet [14]. The NETI@home dataset focuses on end 
user statistics, while the honeynet dataset can be consid- 
ered similar to the network telescope data,  with the excep  
tinn that live hosts will respond to probes. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We used a number of methods to analyze network flows 
over time for NETIQhome data and honeynet data. In 
both datasets, the majority of the TCP flows were failed 
connections. In the honeynet dataset, these flows were ma- 
licious in nature. The NETIQhome dataset has a smaller 
percentage of T C P  flows that were failed connections, and 
these flows were not necessarily malicious in nature. 
The majority of the traffic seen in the honeynet dataset 
consists of port scans and worms. We observed that the 
outbreak of a new worm will linger on for more than a year 
after the release date. Similar patterns were observed in 
the NETIQhome data, although it is difficult to distinguish 
between malicious and legitimate traffic. 
We also found that port scanning was seen by 
NETIOhome users and honeynet machines regularly. By 
using our technique of a TCP port histogram, we were able 
to observe an altruistic port scan of NETIQhome users 
that  slowly scanned the ports over the course of several 
days. Some of the malicious port scanning patterns ob- 
served in the honeynet dataset were also observed in the 
NETI@home dataset. 
We found that both datasets showed similar flow distri- 
butions across the IP address space. In the NETTQhome 
dataset, however, a small number of users were scanning 
most of IP address space in a random fashion on a TCP 
port that is the target of recent worms. Finally, for both 
datasets, the source of malicious and legitimate traffic 
comes from across the entire allocated IF‘ address space. 
We did not observe significant malicious traffic or legiti- 
mate traffic coming from the unallocated IP address space. 
There are a number of future directions to research. We 
intend to do a formal statistical correlation between the 
honeynet da ta  and the NETIOhame da ta  to draw more 
def in i t ive  conclusions. There are numerous other network 
statistics that can be compared such as TTL values, win- 
dow sizes, checksum errors, and so forth. The analysis of 
these areas of research will be conducted in future work. 
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